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Abstract  
 
The general idea of social capital is that relationships matter. In this sense, trust, cooperation 
and reciprocity involved in these relationships can have a positive impact on the wealth of the 
society by reducing transaction costs, facilitating collective actions and lowering 
opportunistic behaviour. This work sheds light on the different theoretical and empirical 
problems that a scholar is likely to face in dealing with social capital research and analysis. 
We propose a critical road map of the social capital theories and applications for a general 
audience, non-users included, with particular attention to the works of political and social 
economists. We provide a critical debate on the different definitions and measures produced, 
the theoretical frameworks developed and the empirical techniques adopted so far in the 
analysis of the impact of social capital on socio-economic outcomes. We stress on the 
limitations of these techniques and we suggest some basic strategies to reduce the magnitude 
of these limitations.     
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1. Introduction 
 
In the last two decades the concept of social capital has been receiving increasing attention by 
scholars from several different areas in the social sciences. The figure describing the 
frequency of references to social capital recorded in the Social Science Citation Index 
between the 1990s and the new century (figure 1) is quite popular. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Frequency of references to social capital recorded in SSCI (1991-2006) 
 
 
Source: Field, J (2008) 
 
In the broader view of social capital theory, the concept predicts that higher associational 
activities inside a community are able to foster a sense of civic engagement where 
cooperation, reciprocity and mutual trust are developed and used in order to solve collective 
action and asymmetric information problems. Whether social capital is a novelty or rather an 
old wine in a new bottle is not object of analysis in this work. Nevertheless, in order to 
capture the original essence of the concept, we might briefly revisit part of the social science 
history. The term “social capital” is unknown until the XX century. However, the idea that 
trust, associational activity and sense of reciprocity contribute to the economic wealth of the 
society has long tradition in the history of sociology and economic thought.  
By revisiting Adam Smith’s thought, Bruni et al (2000) underline the importance that he 
gives to the density of networks and trade associations as the main channels for the 
transmission of reputation for trustworthiness. Even though the aim of this mechanism is the 
individual’s self-interest, in Adam Smith’s view this is crucial for the functioning of the 
market. Focusing on the Italian context, Genovesi (1820) attributes the lack of development 
of Naples compared the other Italian states in the XVIII century to the lack of fede pubblica.  
The concept of fede pubblica (public trust) is defined as trust among individuals (what is 
called “generalised trust” in contemporary terms). Through a more altruistic perspective 
(especially compare to Adam Smith), Genovesi (1820) understands economic relationships as 
driven by a sense of reciprocal assistance and, hence, an exercise of virtue. In his view, trade, 
industry and socio-economic development cannot grow in a society with a low endowment of 
fede pubblica. Contrary to Adam Smith, Genovesi (1820) believes that formal justice cannot 
be imposed successfully in a society where individuals do not trust each other in their 
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informal relationship and this initial condition, in turn, negatively affects the economic 
performance of that society
1
.   
The importance of the associational life has been properly pointed out in the Alexis de 
Tocqueville (1832/1994) investigation of North American society. He is positively impressed 
by the intense North American associational life. He argues that this “art of association” 
represents one of the strengths of the American democracy and economy and helps 
individuals in building social bonds crucial for their well-being and organisational life.  
French sociologists such as Emile Durkheim (1933) and Marcel Mauss (1969) focused most 
of their interests on mechanisms of social relationships. Durkheim (1933) underlines how 
informal connections and interactions characterise the industrial period and distinguish it 
from a more rigid system of the division of labour well developed under feudalism. Mauss 
(1969), in developing the so called “theory of the gift”, identifies in the exchange of “gifts” a 
system of mutual obligations between parties that goes beyond mere economic, sentimental 
or material exchange.  
In a critical review of the conceptual history of social capital, Farr (2004) underlines that the 
term “social capital” was used for the first time in its modern sense by Lyda J. Hanifan in 
1916. In an analysis of the rural West Virginia community, Hanifan refers to social capital as 
“goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy and social intercourse among a group of individuals 
and families” (in Farr, 2004 p. 11). However, as John Field (2008) points out “Although 
earlier writers made some use of the term, there is a broad consensus that its contemporary 
significance derives from the 1980s and 1990s” (Field, 2008 p. 15) and more precisely 
through a triad of social scientists including Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman and Robert 
Putnam.  
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 provides the different definitions of social 
capital; section 3 discusses about the measures of social capital and its structural dimensions; 
section 4 provides a critical debate on different theoretical frameworks developed so far on 
the dilemmatic question: how much social capital we need; section 5 discusses about some of 
the social capital proxies adopted after the Putnam’s work with particular emphasis on the 
Italian case; section 6 is dedicated to the sceptics and scepticisms around the concept of 
social capital; section 7 debates on the empirical limitations of social capital works; section 8 
concludes.        
    
 
2. Social Capital and its Definitions 
 
While numerous definitions of social capital are promoted in the literature, in our road map 
we will concentrate on those we consider relevant for economic purposes and that refer to a 
common basic idea: social networks are valuable assets. 
 Bourdieu (1983/1986: 248) underlines that “Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or 
potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition”. In other words, social 
capital is made up of social obligations and connections within members in a group (Lin, 
2001).   
Coleman (1988, p. S98) considers that “Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a 
single entity, but a variety of different entities, having two characteristics in common: they all 
consist of some aspect of a social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals 
                                                 
1
 For a more accurate analysis about trust and social capital in the thoughts of Adam Smith and Genovesi see 
Bruni et al (2000)  
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who are within the structure”. Still Coleman (1990) highlights that social capital indicates the 
resources, real or potential, gained from relationships. In other words, it is a public good, and 
as public good, it depends on the willingness of the members of the community to avoid free 
riding. For this purpose, norms, trust, sanctions and values become important in sustaining 
this collective asset. A criticism addressed to Coleman is that this functional view might be 
the result of a tautology (Lin 2001): social capital is defined when and if it works. The causal 
factor is defined by its effectual factor. By using an example, for actor X kin ties are social 
capital because they channel X to get a better job, while for actor Y, kin ties are not social 
capital because they do not channel Y to get a better job.  
According to Putnam (2000: 19) “Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and 
human capital refers to the properties of individuals, social capital refers to connections 
among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that 
arise from them. In that sense social capital is closely related to what some have called “civic 
virtue.” The difference is that “social capital” draws attention to the fact that civic virtue is 
most powerful when embedded in a network of reciprocal social relations. Putnam underlines 
that “a society of many virtuous but isolated individuals is not necessarily rich in social 
capital”. Although all the previous definitions describe the concept from different 
perspectives, they nevertheless present a common view: it is the interactions between 
members that make possible the production and maintenance of this social asset.  
To this purpose Lin (2001) points out that if social capital may be defined operationally as 
resources embedded in social networks (or ties) accessed and used by its members, then two 
components have to be taken into account. Firstly, social capital represents resources 
embedded in social relationships rather than individuals. Secondly, the access and the use of 
such resources reside with the members. This implies that “ego must be cognitively aware of 
the presence of such resources in his relations and networks” (Lin, 2001 p. 25). Only if this 
particular condition is satisfied the individual can capitalise on such ties and resources. Hence 
social interactions and embedded resources are the two key elements.  
The importance of social interaction for economic purpose has been theoretically formalised 
by Becker (1974). Part of his analysis focuses on the role of social resources. In the simplest 
scenario we can easily imagine a family and a family income which is the sum of the income 
of its members. This family income might be considered as a family (social) resource that 
will be distributed among its members
2
. If one of the members, k, is hit by a negative shock 
that reduces k’s endowment, then a larger amount of social resource is likely to be transferred 
to k. Each social (family) member will share k’s shock by consuming less. Notice that 
whether k’s share of social (family) resources were negligible, then k will be fully insured 
against the shock since a decline in his endowment would have a negligible effect on the 
family endowment. What is interesting in the model proposed by Becker (1974) is that the 
budget constraint of the head of the family is the result of the total family income and not 
only of his own income. Because the head of the family will maximise his utility subject to 
his budget constraint, anything that increases the family income will increase his utility. This 
means that the head will take into account the effect that his different actions might have on 
the total family income such as changing job with a better salary for instance. In doing so 
Becker (1974 p.1077) says that “the head automatically internalizes the external effects of his 
                                                 
2
 Notice that Becker (1974) takes into account also the possibility of a family where not all the members 
contribute to the social resource. In this case some of the members will be recipients only while some others will 
be both donors and recipients. In a “linear” scenario consider a being the head of the family, hence holding the 
family income and taking care of the other members. Then a will transfer part of his endowment to b. The latter 
will take care of c and therefore b will transfer parts of his endowment to c that in turn will transfer part of her 
endowment to d who is the last ring of the chain. Hence, everybody will transfer part of their endowment except 
for d.    
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actions on other family members”. The term “automatically” is synonymous with 
“voluntarily”. In other words, the head of the family voluntarily internalises his external 
actions for the benefit of the family which will represent the benefit of the head too. In a 
broader view of the meaning “family resources” we might consider not only the income but 
also other resources such as time, moral help, information, advice and so on. For example the 
respect of manners and rules of personal behaviour among family members might represent a 
clear example of internalised external actions. A member of the family (the head for 
example) “would eat with his fingers only if its value exceeds the value (to him) of the 
disgust experienced by his family” (Becker, 1974 p. 1078). This framework can be extended 
to a larger network with more interactions and agents (Becker 1974).  
By combining networks with embedded resources Granovetter (1973, 1983) formalises the 
concept of “The Strength of the Weak Ties”. A community is likely to be made by different 
social circles: family, friends, colleagues and so on. The connections inside a social circle 
(for instance a family) are characterised according to Granovetter (1973) by strong ties. The 
members belonging to the same circle are likely to share similar, if not identical, 
information
3
. If an individual wants to have access to different information he needs a link 
with a different social circle too. The ties between different social circles are called bridges 
without which the circles will be independent. The combination between these two types of 
connections is an advantage in order to have a more spread information flow and 
characterises what Granovetter (1973) defines as the “Strength of weak ties”. Individuals 
having different types of connections can count on a more diversified social endowment.  
 
 
 
Figure 2 Diagram of Bridging VS Bonding Connections 
 
 
 
 
In figure 2 we depict three different circles with different members belonging to each of the 
circle. The arrows identify the connections between two or more members. 
                                                 
3
 The individual embedded in a social circle tends to have characteristics homophilous with the other members 
of the same circle. By homophilous interactions Granovetter means the interactions that occur between two 
actors having similar resources (for instance information). 
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The connections between two members belonging to the same circle (e.g.  C-B or L-P or T-S) 
represent bonding connections (or strong ties) while connections between two or more 
different circles (e.g. R-B R-H or M-S or A-N) represent bridges (or weak ties). 
Lin (2001) points out that social capital extends as far as the social networks of the members 
of the groups. This is because resources can be accessed through direct and indirect 
connections. For instance, in figure 2, A and N are directly connected, but M is connected to 
A through N. Let’s assume that M is interested in a particular job position and that 
“information X” (for instance extra details, not available in the market, about the job position 
and the interviewer) is a social resource able to increase the probabilities for M to get that 
job. M can use her social network in order to access the “information X”. If the direct contact 
N does not possess this information but he knows someone else who does, let’s say A, then A 
represents for M an indirect tie and he will be part of M’s social capital.     
Once established the importance of the network and the embedded resources, Lin (2001) 
includes in his visual model of social capital (figure 3) a postulate based on the original 
position of the individual inside the network. This postulate is called the “Strength of Position 
Proposition” and indicates that, considering a member of a network, the better the position of 
origin, the more likely it is that this member will access and better use the social capital. For 
instance a better educated individual might use his connections in order to achieve higher 
goals than a less educated individual. An individual with a high income or a high social status 
might have better connections inside the society and achieve higher level of wealth or well-
being relative to an individual with a low social status or low income (it is more likely for a 
lawyer to have a doctor within her friends than for a plumber). The initial position may 
represent an advantage in terms of quality of connections and reputation (better status).  
The member’s social interactions (through strong and weak, direct and indirect ties) can 
provide access to the embedded resources under the necessary condition that the member is 
aware of the existence of such resources (Lin 2001). Lin (2001) concludes that the access to 
this form of capital can make the individual better off in terms of wealth, well-being, power 
and so on.    
 
 
 
Figure 3 General Schematic Visual Model of Social Capital 
 
 
Source: Re-elaboration of the visual model of social capital of Lin (2001) 
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3. Measuring Social Capital and Its Structural Dimensions 
 
Since the work of Putnam et al (1993), several measures of social capital and empirical works 
have been produced. However, there are still problems in accepting results and methods. One 
of the main reasons for the criticism is the still elusive definition of the concept (Sabatini, 
2006). The most common and popular approaches to measuring social capital are: census of 
groups and group memberships (Beugelsdijk and van Schaik 2005) in a given society 
(Putnam et al 1993); the use of survey data on level of trust (Fukuyama 2001, Kanck and 
Keefer 1997), civic participation (Casey 2004), crime rate (Lutz et al 2004), blood donations 
(Guiso et al 2004) and so on.  
Woolcock (1998) and Fukuyama (2001) argue that although trust and associational activity 
are used as social capital indicators, they might instead be one of its consequences rather than 
the social capital itself.  
The use participation in voluntary organisation employed by Putnam et al (1993) to explain 
the difference of well-being between the Northern and Southern Italy is subject to criticisms.   
First of all, voluntary associations might be characterised by groups that are relatively 
homogeneous in character (Sabatini, 2006). This high level of homogeneity within the group 
is likely to reduce new possible bridges between circles.  
Secondly, measures that use associations might not be robust enough if they do not take into 
account the different types of organisations. Some types of organisations (for instance trade 
unions or commercial lobbies) might adopt rent-seeking strategies (Olson 1982). Hence, 
group members might impose costs on non-members in the pursuit of members’ interests. 
This condition might vary with a society’s governance structures. In societies where legal 
enforcement is more efficient and property rights more secured “Olson’s scenario” is less 
likely to occur (Knack 1999, 2001).      
The use of survey data on trust and civic engagement faces other conceptual problems. For 
instance, the measure of trust is drawn from public opinion surveys such as the WVS (World 
Value Survey) where the question about generalised trust is based on the following statement: 
“generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can be too 
careful in dealing with people?” The possible responses to this question are: “Most people 
can be trusted”, “Can’t be too careful”, or “Don’t know”. The trust indicator is given by the 
percentage of people giving the first answer. One of the problems related to this measure is 
that it is not clear if respondents interpret the meaning of “trust” or “most people” in the same 
way across countries, cultures and times (ages) (OECD 2001). This problem becomes even 
more prevalent in cross-national studies.  
The employment of alternative macro indicators such as crime rate, blood donation and civic 
participation is not immune to criticisms either. It is argued that these indicators can create 
considerable confusion about what social capital is and its outcome (Sabatini, 2006).  
The crucial missing element is that all these indicators mentioned so far do not consider 
enough the structural dimensions of social capital. According to Uphoff (1999) the structural 
dimension of social capital refers to a variety of networks that contribute to cooperation and 
more specifically to mutually beneficial collective actions. Indeed, social networks can be 
considered as a powerful mean to spread information and knowledge at lower transaction 
costs and uncertainty (Sabatini, 2006; Grootaert 2001). For instance, if we consider the 
industrial district arena, social networks involving workers of different firms may act as a 
powerful mean to foster information, trust and knowledge (Saxenian, 1996). Hence, the 
structural dimensions of social capital become crucial in order to construct a “reliable” 
indicator. For “reliable” we mean a social capital indicator that satisfies the trust-
cooperation complex of Paldam (2000). This particular concept indicates that trust and 
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cooperation are two interlinked elements that any social capital indicator should be able to 
satisfy somehow
4
 and it can be expressed as follows: 
 
 
Trust  ease of voluntary cooperation   e              (1) 
 
 
Where: e is a small error; the ease of voluntary cooperation indicates the ability of 
individuals to work together, which also corresponds to the definition of social capital 
provided by Coleman (1988); trust indicates the trust among the individuals involved in the 
process of cooperation. The trust-cooperation complex implies that the structural dimension 
of social capital play a fundamental role in the construction of the measure.      
 The structural dimensions of social capital recall the network analysis advanced by 
Granovetter (1973). The different types of connections among the members characterise not 
only different types of relationships but also different types of structural dimensions of social 
capital. To our knowledge the literature so far has identified three main dimensions: bonding, 
bridging and linking social capital. These dimensions are not mutually exclusive and each of 
them has its own characteristics and its own impact on the socio-economic dynamics of the 
society. 
 
3.1 Bonding Social Capital 
Bonding social capital indicates strong family ties where social relationships are 
characterised by trust and reciprocity. As the social capital and poverty transition mechanism 
(Narayan and Woolcock 2000) explains this initial system of strong in-group connections 
helps the members to deal with socio-economic problems such as providing loan to 
somebody with very poor or inexistent material collateral. However, this mechanism also 
remarks that when the individuals have access exclusively to this type of resource, they are 
less likely to escape poverty
5
. In fact, as the “strength of weak ties” theory predicts, when 
bonding social capital becomes exclusive, then, the network becomes a closed one. This 
implies that the access to extra resources (for instance information) possessed by other groups 
is reduced, if not denied, with the main consequence of lowering social capital endowment. 
Another characteristic of the bonding social capital is the strong reciprocity operating among 
the members of the group. This might be the consequence of a strong system of mutual 
obligations. For instance Harris (2007) analyses the relationship between bonding social 
capital and corruption perception across countries. She finds that in closed groups where 
specific reciprocity is highly valued, corrupt exchange might be considered acceptable as 
“good reciprocity” between peers. If so, then the moral cost associated with such an exchange 
can be low. Within the Italian context, Sabatini (2009) is probably the most popular 
economist that has constructed a structural index of bonding social capital. By using a 
principal component analysis, he combines elements such as family composition, spatial 
distance between family members, the relevance of other relatives and the quality of 
relationships both with family members and with other relatives into a unique synthetic 
indicator. He finds that between 1998 and 2002 bonding social capital is higher in the 
southern regions than in the north of the country.  
 
 
                                                 
4
 Notice that in the literature it is still ambiguous whether these two concepts are causally linked one to each 
other. In Sonderskov’s (2008) impression this link in the literature seems to be treated more as an assumption 
rather than a theoretical and/or empirical justification.   
5
 See section 4 for further details. 
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3.2 Bridging Social Capital 
Bridging social capital indicates the networks of friends, neighbours and acquaintances. It 
represents the “strength of weak ties” a la Granovetter (1973). In other words, it indicates the 
bridges between the bonding groups. The ties with individuals belonging to other groups 
open the access to resources different from those embedded in the initial bonding group. 
Hence, the information and knowledge traded between groups allows the community to 
benefit from a diversified social endowment accumulation and, therefore, more social capital. 
This, in turn, should contribute to the wealth of the community. The lack of bridging social 
capital type might characterise the different in development and growth between areas even 
within the same country. For instance, several scholars argue that one of the reasons for 
which the southern Italian regions economically underperform compared to the northern 
regions has to be attributed to the different level of bridging social capital between the two 
parts of the country (De Blasio and Nuzzo 2010; Guiso et al 2004; Lyon 2005; Nuzzo 2006; 
Putnam et al 1993; Sabatini 2005; 2009).   
In fact, if we consider the network based on friends, in Italy in the 1998, the 60.3% of 
individual males declare to have friends to count on while for the women this percentage is 
lower (55.6%)
6
. Notice the difference between geographic partitions: 62.2% North-East, 
61.4% North-West, 58.1% Centre, 56.6% islands, 51% South. In the 2003 the percentage of 
individuals declaring to have friends to count on decreases (59.3%). Still, in the North-East 
there is the highest percentage of individuals with friends to count on (64.6%) and in the 
North-West (63.2%) against the South (51.2%).  
 
3.3 Linking Social Capital 
Linking social capital indicates ties connecting individuals or groups to people and groups in 
position of different political or financial power (Sabatini, 2009). Hence, unlike the first two 
dimensions, the linking one represents a vertical relationship
7
. In theory this type of 
connections should permit individuals or communities to access resources or information 
from institutions of power. For instance, NGOs operating in developing countries might do 
extensive use of this link. For an NGO the possibility of having connections with the local 
authority might be a value added. Through these vertical connections, the NGO can obtain 
essential information for delivering a better social service to the local community. However, 
this vertical relationship is not always positive and its beneficial effect is most of the time 
context oriented. It has been debated that in non-democratic countries the dominant strategy 
adopted by some NGOs is to build vertical relationships with local authorities through 
clientelistic connections. This strategy is employed to crease the likelihood for the NGOs to 
operate in that area if not in that country (Jamal, 2009). This might imply, sometimes, a tacit 
contract between the NGO and the local authority according to which the service provided by 
the organisation should not be in conflict with the policy approach adopted by the authority 
(Jamal, 2009).  
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 This statistics derive from the report on “Relatives and safety net” conducted by the ISTAT in 1998 and 2003. 
7
 Notice that this scenario should not be confused with the impact of social capital on the financial market, 
especially within the lender-borrower relationship. The lender-borrower relationship is more horizontal than 
vertical. In this sense the fact that a financial counsellor is integrated in the social network of the local 
community, allows him to acquire information about potential clients through the informal relationships the 
counsellor holds with the rest of the community (Ferray 2002). This should contribute to reduce the asymmetric 
information occurring between the lender and the borrower and, hence, to possibly reduce the risk related to 
their lending activity. 
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4. The Social Capital Dilemma: How much Social Capital do we 
need? 
 
While human capital resides in individuals, social capital resides in relationships and trust is a 
fundamental ingredient of the engine that makes these relationships work. Fukuyama (2001) 
identifies in the concept of the radius of trust (figure 4) the mechanism that facilitates 
cooperation among individuals. The radius of trust “is the circle of people among whom co-
operative norms are operative” (Fukuyama, 2001 p. 8). According to Fukuyama (2001), a 
modern society can be represented as a set of “concentric and overlapping radius of trust” 
ranging from families, friends, religious groups, NGOs and so on. From this scenario there 
are two possible outcomes. Firstly, the radius of trust is larger than the group itself by 
producing, in this case, positive externalities. Secondly, the radius of trust is smaller than the 
group itself which means that not all the members belonging to that group benefit from this 
“social resource”. In the second case the classical dichotomy insider-outsider occurs. 
Nooteboom (2006) reinforces Fukuyama’s statement underlining that “trust” has extrinsic 
instrumental values in helping to reduce the risk of transaction costs of relationships. More 
precisely, formal means of control such as government control or legal contracts are not able 
to completely eliminate relational risks. That is why some degree of trust is always needed 
(Nooteboom 2006). 
 
 
 
Figure 4 The Radius of Trust 
 
 
 
Source: Fukuyama (2001) 
 
 
This condition is strictly related to the social capital dilemma set out by Woolcock (1998). 
The bottom line of this dilemma is that both “too little” and “too much” social capital at any 
given institutional level can impede economic performance. Let’s consider a society made up 
of individuals, households and small groups of communities. The trust between the members 
of a community is called in the literature “generalised trust”. Notice that this does not indicate 
the level of trust in a specific individual, rather the person’s level of trust towards other 
people when no other information is available (Sonderskov, 2008). On the other hand, the 
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trust that occurs between the members of a community and the institutions running that 
community is called “institutional trust”. Woolcock (1998) proposes a model of social capital 
based on two dimensions, integration and linkage, interacting one to another. He defines 
“Integration” a process that develops intra-community ties. The more intensive the social ties 
and generalised trust within a given community are, the higher is the endowment of this form 
of social capital. On the other side, he defines “Linkage” the extra-community networks, in 
other words, the bridges (using Granovetter’s terminology) that can be built between two or 
more different communities. The dilemma says that “more is not necessarily better”. To this 
purpose Woolcock (1998) identifies four cases (figure 5). 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Linkage and Integration 
 
 
Source: Woolcock (1998) 
 
The first case identifies high integration and low linkage. This occurs when trust is mainly 
present among family members or blood relatives and absent across different groups then 
non-developmental reality is likely to be present. A situation characterised by strong social 
integration and the absence of linkage has been called by Edward Banfield
8
 (1958) “amoral 
familism”.  The second case identifies the absence of both integration and linkage. This leads 
to what Woolcock (1998) calls “amoral individualism” according to which members are 
isolated from all forms of cohesive and social networks. The third case is characterised by the 
presence of high linkage and low integration. Woolcock (1998) calls this case “anomie”, 
where individuals have the freedom and opportunity to participate in a wide range of 
activities but without a stable community base able to provide guidance, support and identity 
(e.g. urban setting and modernisation). Finally, the last case is the best possible scenario 
where both integration and linkage work and therefore strong and weak ties together increase 
social opportunities. 
It is clear that the main weakness of this particular form of capital is that there needs to be 
balance between its bonding and bridging side.  
The importance in the balance between bonding and bridging social capital is clearly 
explained in the dynamic of the so called social capital and poverty transition mechanism 
(Figure 6) designed by Narayan and Woolcock (2000). Social capital is composed of two 
crucial elements: network and embedded resources. Given this condition, the economic 
development occurs through a mechanism where bonding and bridging social capital coexist. 
This mechanism implies that individuals not only acquire skills and resources embedded in 
their initial community (bonding), but also “skills and resources to participate in networks 
                                                 
8
 Banfield identified “amoral familism” as one of the main causes of Southern Italy’s underdevelopment 
(Sabatini, 2005) 
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that transcend their community (bridging), thereby progressively joining the economic 
mainstream” (Narayan and Woolcock, 2000, pg. 232). 
 
 
Figure 6 Social capital and poverty transitions mechanism 
 
 Source: Narayan and Woolcock (2000)  
 
The mechanism described in figure 6 follows different phases that are inter-correlated one to 
another in the following order:     
(A) Poor village individuals (for ex. women) with no material collateral receive loans or help 
thanks to their membership in a small peer group. This helps them to start or to expand a 
small business and therefore to improve their families’ welfare. 
(B)  Because of the limited extension and resources (material and non-material) of any given 
group, the return will reach a maximum after which will start to decrease.  
(C) This happens especially when the group exclusively rely on endowments deriving from 
“bonding” social capital 
(D) Moreover, long-term members of the group might find (especially in the case of group-based 
credit programs) that obligations and commitments with their colleagues represent serious 
obstacles for further advancement, especially for the more ambitious.  
(E) In order to escape from this bonding trap, members try to build a more diversified network, 
creating ties with members belonging to other groups. This increases the level of “bridging” 
social capital and, therefore, rises economic opportunities. 
The diagram in figure 6 shows also that while social groups belonging to poor villages 
intensify bonding links in order to fight against uncertainty (“defence” approach), non-poor 
groups tend to create a system of bridging network and play “offense”. This view is in line 
with the concept of the “Strength of Position Proposition” advanced by Lin (2001), a 
postulate indicating that the better the member’s position of origin is, the more likely it is that 
this member will access and better use the social capital. In other words, people starting with 
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a higher endowment, have more probability to diversify their social capital between bonding 
and bridging side. 
As Woolcock and Narayan (2000) underline, one of the main challenges is to identify the 
conditions that help the communities of poor to have better access to bridging social capital 
type without, simultaneously, undermining the many positive aspects of their bonding social 
capital stock. 
   
 
5. After Putnam: Measures of Social Capital in Italy 
 
Putnam’s theory predicts that heterogeneous performance across regions sharing the same 
formal institution can be explained by different regional endowment of social capital (De 
Blasio et al, 2010). In the “Italian work”, Putnam et al (1993) point out that historical 
informal institutions such as family and friends network, voluntary associations and people’s 
interest on public affairs, are persistent and able to explain current economic differences 
between the North and the South of the country. This has stimulated social scientists to 
develop further investigation about the rule of social capital in the Italian context and not 
only. In this section, we mention, in particular, the contribution provided by those works that 
have proposed new social capital indicators
9
.  
Guiso et al (2004) warn that the selection of the most “appropriate” indicators represents the 
main obstacle in social capital works. To this purpose, the literature seems to have adopted 
two distinctive types of indicators (table 1).  
 
 
Table 1 Social capital indicators in Italy 
 
Nuzzo (2006) Sabatini (2009) Guiso et al (2004) 
Synthetic measures Synthetic measures  Outcome-based measures 
Sub-indicators 
A Social Participation 
B Political Participation 
C Trust 
 
Final indicator 
SC = simple mean of  
A + B + C 
 
 
Five Indicators 
 
1.Family ties 
 
2. Informal networks of 
friends and neighbours 
 
3. Voluntary 
Organisations 
 
4. Indicator of political 
participation 
  
5. Indicator of civic 
awareness 
Two indicators 
 
1. Blood donation 
 
2. Electoral turnout 
 
                                                 
9
 Notice that this section does not imply a critical discussion regarding the efficiency of these “new” indicators 
on economic outcomes. The idea is to provide a general picture of the main approaches used to construct 
additional social capital measures applied to the Italian context. This should also transmit to the reader the sense 
of continuity and the progresses made by the scholars after the “Italian work”.  
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Some scholars have proposed new social capital synthetic indicators based on the 
combination of different social attitudes (De Blasio and Nuzzo, 2010; Nuzzo, 2006; Micucci 
and Nuzzo, 2010; Sabatini 2009). The main reason of this approach is the multidimensional 
nature of the concept of social capital. The synthetic approach combines many different 
social aspects nsasasa ,...,, 21  
(such as family and friends network, interest in public affairs, 
trust in people and institutions and so on) into a single synthetic measure  . Indeed, a 
measure including many social aspects is conceptually more complete than a simple 
outcome-based indicator. Moreover, these types of measures allow researchers to create 
weights, especially at regional level. Hence, regional ranking can be made according to these 
weights. However, the indicator is called synthetic properly because it represents a virtual 
construction. In other words,   is very difficult to define. 
Other scholars have adopted the so called outcome-based social capital measures (Guiso et al, 
2004). These refer to those social behaviours determined by high level of civic spirit and 
generalised trust. Compared to the synthetic proxy, the construction of an outcome-based 
social capital indicator follows an inverse mechanism. As the term may suggest, the outcome-
based indicators are based on outcome and expressions of “social capital”. The choice of an 
outcome-based indicator is driven by a fundamental requirement: the indicator contains many 
social aspects such as nsasasa ,...,, 21  in order to exist. For instance, the two outcome-based 
indicators proposed by Guiso et al (2004) are turnout referenda that occurred during the 
period 1946-1989
10
 and the proportion of blood donation
11
. They argue that since electoral 
turnout and blood donations are the outcome and expressions of “civic spirit” then reverse 
causality problems are mitigated. In this case, the decision of excluding direct measures of 
trust as social capital proxy is justified by the idea that trust might create “misleading” 
interpretation and contaminate the robustness of the analysis. For instance, Guiso et al (2004 
p. 527) pose the following question “is the level of trust a New Yorker exhibits in her daily 
economic behaviour the result of good law enforcement or the product of high level of social 
capital?” Unlike the synthetic indicator, this is not the result of a virtual construction. 
However, these indicators can create considerable confusion about what social capital is and 
its outcome (Sabatini, 2006).  
It is interesting to compare the empirical evidence provided by these works. There are no 
major differences in terms of the macro-distribution of the social capital in the country. In 
fact, regardless the social capital measure adopted, all the three works confirm a “skewed” 
distribution of social capital toward the northern regions. However, each work analyse the 
impact of social capital under a different perspective.        
 Nuzzo (2006) proposes regional social capital proxies covering the entire XX century. The 
aim of his work is to investigate whether regional differences in social capital endowment are 
persistent or convergent with particular attention to the southern area. To our knowledge, 
Nuzzo’s construction of historical time series of regional social capital is the only work of 
this type. The social capital measure proposed by Nuzzo (2006) is the combination (simple 
mean) of three main social capital “sub-indicators” which are social participation, political 
participation and generalised trust (table 1). Empirical evidence indicates a small 
convergence of South until 1960 and a higher convergence after 1990 (figure 7).  
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 This indicator is also included in the synthetic index of Nuzzo (2006) 
11
 Notice that we will develop a more critical discussion about the work proposed by Guiso et al (2004) in 
Chapter 3 when we analyse the relationship between social capital and credit marktet.  
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Figure 7 Geographical partition of social capital during the period 1901-2001 
 
Source: author’s re-elaboration of data from Nuzzo (2006) 
 
The interesting part of the story is that the convergence does not affect the southern group 
homogeneously but cross-regional differences occur. After 1990 the regions Abruzzo and 
Sardegna face a major improvement (above the national mean), contrary to Campania (figure 
8). 
 
 
Figure 8 Social capital in the southern regions during the XX century 
 
 
Source: author’s re-elaboration of data from Nuzzo (2006) 
 
 
 
Like Nuzzo (2006), Sabatini (2009) constructs regional synthetic social capital indicators 
even though not within an historical time-series framework. In analysing the relationship 
between social capital and socio-economic performance in Italy, Sabatini (2009) uses a 
principal component analysis to construct five different synthetic measures, most of them 
based on the structural dimensions. The data derive from the national statistical office 
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(ISTAT) and are based on the years 1998-2002. Not surprisingly, Sabatini (2009) finds that 
the measure indicating bonding relationship (family social capital) is quite high among the 
southern regions. On the other hands, indicators of bridging social capital and density of 
voluntary association show higher values in the northern regions. Similar to Nuzzo (2006), 
statistical evidence shows that among the southern group, the region Abruzzo presents the 
lowest bonding social capital value while the region Sardegna the highest bridging social 
capital and voluntary organisations value. In the Centre and in the North the regions 
Piemonte and Lazio show a very low political participation. The latter shows also a “deficit” 
of bridging and voluntary organisations.  
Guiso et al (2004) find a robust and significant positive impact of the outcome-based social 
capital indicator on the financial development. Notice that the geographical distribution of the 
outcome-based measure “turnout of referenda” (Figure 9) is similar to the distribution of the 
indicator proposed by Nuzzo (2006).  It is quite evident the gap between South and North. 
Unlike Nuzzo (2006), the southern region Puglia presents a higher performance compare to 
the rest of the South. 
 
 
Figure 9 Geographical distribution of turnout of referenda 
        
 
Source: Guiso et al (2004) 
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6. The Dark Side of Social Capital 
 
In the Heraclitus’ theory of the opposites, in nature for any element there exists its contrary 
such that two opposites constitute the unity. Therefore, according to this theory we might 
expect to deal with a dark side of social capital too. Moving from the ancient Greek 
philosophy to more contemporary economic studies, Naryan and Woolcock (2000) describe 
social capital as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, social capital can represent a 
valuable asset for economic and well being improvement. On the other hand, exclusive strong 
ties and strict sense of obligations might be at a certain point a cost without related benefits 
for the community. As a double-edged sword, cooperation among members of a certain group 
does not necessarily imply that the goal is the benefit of the common good (Portes, 1998; 
Field, 2008). For instance, while group members (insiders) can benefit from common 
resources, the outsider might be excluded and under certain circumstances isolated by 
creating an environment of general distrust. In some cases “very inclusive social networks 
leave individuals with little freedom” (Sciarrone, 2002 p. 2). The Italian Mafia is a quite 
emblematic expression of the negative side of social capital (Sciarrone, 2002; Gambetta, 
2000; Field, 2008). In an analysis of social capital and Mafia, Sciarrone (2002 p.11) recalls 
the words of Antonio Calderone, State’s witness, who stated: “the Mafioso is like a spider. 
He builds webs of friendships, of acquaintances, of obligations”. Actually, the network built 
by the Mafia takes advantage of the “strength of the weak ties”. The Mafioso’s success is 
based on the tight ties built locally through which he creates a system of loyalties and 
obligations. At the same time, he creates bridges with external groups and among dissimilar 
networks by extending in this way their connections outside their initial circle and increasing 
the Mafia influence in the society. Historically this type of network has emerged because of 
the lack of credible and effective law enforcement. This alternative “community governance” 
implies inclusion and exclusion mechanisms simultaneously. Notice that its members 
apparently call this organisation “Cosa nostra” which means that “the Thing is ours, not 
yours”. According to Gambetta (2000), this mechanism has increased even more the level of 
general and institutional distrust among citizens where the Mafia intensively operates.    
Whether trust and associational activities are the engines of social capital, these two elements 
do not always lead to the desirable outcome, at least for academic purposes. In analysing the 
barriers to democracy and the social capital in the Palestinian Territories, Jamal (2009) points 
out how geopolitical frameworks affect the directions of trust and associational activities. The 
peculiar political and institutional situation in the West Bank has led to a polarisation of the 
civic associations divided into pro-PNA and “anti”-PNA (PNA denotes Palestinian National 
Authority). Within this particular context, Jamal (2009) underlines that government 
supportive associations are more likely to receive benefits that non-supportive associations do 
not receive. This impartial treatment is due to the existence of strong vertical ties between 
government and organisations that facilitate a system of clientelistic linkages where 
association leaders work as intermediaries between association members and government. 
Unlike the face-to-face cooperative interaction promoted by Putnam (1993, 2000), this 
process of hierarchic connections affects the direction of trust tremendously. Actually, among 
the actors involved in the system the level of interpersonal trust (trust among like-minded 
individuals) is definitively high. However, this “trust is contingent on the guarantee of 
political access” (Jamal 2009 p. 80). In addiction to the asymmetric and polarised distribution 
of economic wealth inside the community, this situation causes a further obstacle to the 
development of the democratic process. Non-clientelistic organisations learn the prevailing 
clientelistic tendency in society and they understand their isolation. Given the isolation, their 
lack of trust is a logical consequence. 
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Glaeser (in “Social Capital Critical Perspectives” p. 113, Baron et al. 2000) defines trust as 
the commitment of resources to an activity where the outcome depends upon the cooperative 
behaviour of others. However, according to Fukuyama (2001), even though trust has a 
general positive value, it might represent an opportunity for those who wish to engage in 
fraud. The more an individual inside a community is trusted by the other members, the less 
his actions are monitored by the rest of the community. This implies that the individual has 
greater possibilities if he wants to engage in fraud.  
   
 
 
 
7. What about the Sceptics? 
 
 
Despite the increasing number of works on social capital, some economists are still sceptical 
about its correct use and its definition as capital. Arrow (1999) considers that “capital” is 
something “alienable” and its ownership cannot be transferred from one person to another. 
Therefore, it is difficult – as with human capital – to change the ownership of social capital12. 
Routledge and Von Amsberg (2003) relate social participation to labour turnover. More 
precisely, high labour turnover means that people devote more time to work and 
consumption, hence sustaining growth, and less time for social participation 
According to Ben Fine (2002a p.1) “social capital should, in general, be rejected rather than 
adopted or adapted” for several reasons. Firstly, “the notion is simply chaotic as is reflected 
in frequent suggestions that it is merely a metaphor or a heuristic device” and this is because 
the definition is still elusive with lots of confusion among scholars in the wish to distinguish 
between what it is from what it does. Secondly, Rather than seeking for a standard and 
precise measure, scholars attempt to include randomly variables in the hope of receiving the 
expected outcomes. Not only this makes the measure unreliable, but also it has a backward 
effect on the reliability of the notion of social capital itself. Thirdly, social capital seems to 
have become the cure of every dysfunctional aspect of the society. Indeed “Social capital has 
a gargantuan appetite. It explains everything from individuals to society, the sick, the poor, 
the criminal, the corrupt... schooling, democracy and governance and so on” (Fine, 2002b 
p.1). Besides these reasonable remarks, Ben Fine is also concerned about the strategic role 
that the economic discipline has been playing inside the larger social science set in the last 20 
years. In his view, the notion and the concept of social capital has been used by economists in 
order to colonise the rest of the social science disciplines. He points out, for instance, that 
miraculously the social capital syndrome is the responsible for the “ironic” changing of 
opinion about the role played by customs and traditions in the African economy. In simple 
words, customs and traditions considered the main obstacle to market efficacy under the 
Washington Consensus, now are seen as a crucial resource for the local economy.    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 However, Uzzi (1997) shows that embeddedness made by two agents can be transferred to a third agent. In a 
way, this is like transferring the ownership of social capital 
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8. Empirical Works on Social Capital and their Limitations 
  
Much empirical work has attempted to test the role of social capital relative to socio-
economic outcomes such as income, poverty, crime rate, health and so on. Cross sectional 
analysis represents the main and still most popular econometric methodology used so far. The 
reasons why this standard practice has been dominating empirical papers are at least two. 
Firstly, the use of survey-questionnaires allows social scientists to capture different aspects of 
the life, habits and social conditions of individuals that might affect their wealth. However, 
very often this type of data set is based on a particular year and it is not always repeated 
consistently in subsequent years. Even when surveys are conducted with a regular frequency, 
this might not always occur on a yearly basis. 
Secondly, opinions and perceptions about attitudes, codes of conducts, norms, values and 
trust are not likely to change dramatically on a yearly basis. On the contrary, unlike popular 
economic variables such as investment, consumption and unemployment, these “opinion-
shaped-variables” might require a remarkable length of time in order to change (for instance 
it is likely that my opinion about trusting other people in general might remain unchanged 
from one year to another. This means that it might take more than three or four years for an 
opinion about a particular value to change). Hence, under these circumstances, panel or time 
series analysis might not produce the expected outcome. Hence, more “consistent” analysis 
might apply pooled cross section methodologies that allow the social scientist to detect, at 
least, the co-movements of the aggregate variables over a period of time that is above the 
year. The merit of these approaches is to include socio-economic variables in the model 
specification in order to capture what, quite reasonably, the pure economic model leaves 
aside (Contini, 2010). However, the lack of data and a not yet established theoretical 
framework reduce somehow the consistency of the empirical analysis leaving large room 
(maybe too large and too often) for the author’s interpretation of the results. Relative to these 
issues, Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) identify some of the main problems which are 
common in the empirical literature of social capital. Firstly, in analysis at the individual level 
it is not always clear whether individual returns from social capital are good indicators of 
aggregate returns. For instance the employment relationship might create informal networks 
where individual returns to social capital (inside the network) might exceed social returns and 
therefore generate unequal outcomes by reinforcing the insider-outsider system. Secondly, 
model specifications might raise problems of exchangeability linked to the problem of 
choosing the control variables in the regression. This problem refers to the choice of a model 
that is not correctly specified. In this sense, the model does not work across different 
contexts. In other words, observations and specific models should be comparable across 
different contexts. The unlucky alternative would be that “the residuals in the sample will 
contain forms of heterogeneity that call into question the placement of the observations in a 
common regression” (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004 p.32) with the unhappy consequence of a 
specific model that work only for that particular case study and from which it is not able to 
deduct any “general regression” useful for other studies and cases. Thirdly, some empirical 
analysis might suffer from model uncertainty and more precisely from parameter 
heterogeneity. This indicates models where some variables are “fragile”. For instance, in 
cross-country analysis some variables can explain the relationship only relative to some 
countries and not to others. If we consider the case of empirical research on social variables 
affecting economic growth, “growth regressions” imply a dependent variable measuring 
economic growth and a series of control variables in order to explain the growth patterns. 
Recent works such as Hineline (2008) following SalaiMartin (1997) underline the “fragility” 
of some explanatory variables. More precisely, by slightly changing the control variables, the 
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coefficients become statistically not significant and the analysis is shown not to be robust. 
Brock and Durlauf (2001) also notice that in cross section analysis with aggregate data the 
selection of the pool countries might crucially affect policy implications. By revisiting 
Easterly and Levine (1997), Brock and Dulauf (2001) find that the negative relationship 
between ethnolinguistic diversity and growth is significant only for Sub-Saharan Africa. This 
means that this variable is not able to explain growth also in other countries. The main 
question, then, is whether to group countries such as US and Japan with developing countries 
inside the same empirical model is an advisable strategy for general policy implication.  
Fourthly, empirical models that try to explain the effect of social capital on economic 
outcome might suffer of reverse causality problems. The direction of the arrow of the 
causality is not always clear. Does higher level of income induce individuals to trust more or 
to be more reliable or the other way round? This is a common problem especially in 
aggregate measures. A set of social capital measures might capture also some other elements 
not taken into account in the research but maybe crucial for the interpretation of the results. 
Fifthly, one of the critiques (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004; Lyon 2005) that Helliwell and 
Putnam (1996) receive is the omission in their regressions of the geographical location of the 
Italian regions. Omitted variables can lead to the so called endogeneity problems. For 
instance, does a dummy south, indicating the southern regions, lead to the same results? In 
order to avoid problems of endogeneity of regressors and reverse causation some papers 
include instrumental variables (Guiso et al, 2004; Kanck and Keefer, 1997 for instance). That 
these works have provided a substantial contribution to the social capital literature is 
probably common opinion, however the use of this methodology has not been immune to 
criticisms. To this purpose the main problem is based on “the absence of any strong theories 
of aggregate social capital determination in the social science literature that would allow to 
characterize appropriate instruments” (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004 p.53). In other words, in 
absence of a strong theory, the choice of the “instrument” becomes too arbitrary with the risk 
of causing model specifications and model uncertainty (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004). In 
additions, in front of small sample size (like in Helliwell and Putnman 2000) the use of 
instrumental variables (IV) is strongly discouraged. Indeed in small samples, IV estimators 
can have a substantial bias which is one of the reasons why large samples are preferred 
(Wooldridge, 2006).  
To our knowledge so far nobody has proposed a general recipe in order to avoid the problems 
listed above. So does this section. The lack of a strong theoretical structure, at least in pure 
economic terms, is probably due to the multidimensionality of the concept and to the recent 
spread interests in this topic. Here, we can speculate on the adoption of some strategies (not 
exhaustive list) that even though cannot avoid the main problems previously underlined, they 
might, at least, reduce their magnitude.  
Firstly, geographical and demographical variables should be included in the empirical models 
as suggested by Goroatert (2001). This is likely to reduce endogeneity and reverse causality 
problems.  
Secondly, in a cross country or cross-regional analysis, the use of country or regional fix 
effects might mitigate the problem of model uncertainty, since they might incorporate the 
effects of omitted variables capturing elements of democracy, human rights system and 
institutional enforcement characteristics (such as the legal system for instance)        
Thirdly, with respect to reverse causality problems, in some cases lagged variables of human 
capital and social capital are also included as suggested by knack and Keefer (1997). 
Fourthly, in absence of a strong theoretical framework, strong theoretical models can be 
borrowed from other sub-disciplines. The most simple but quite clear example is the 
empirical work of Knack and Keefer (1997) where the variables associational activity is 
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tested through a sensitivity analysis where Olson and Putnam group associations are 
distinguished one from another and included in a classical growth theoretical model.  
Finally, the choice of the social capital variable and the methodology to apply is indeed one 
of the key factors that must be taken into account. Empirical works such as Sabatini (2006, 
2009), Lion (2005) use composite indicators. As mentioned in section 5, this implies a 
selection of different social dimensions combined together into a unique index. On one hand, 
this type of proxy might be more complete, at least conceptually. On the other hand, it 
becomes impossible to understand which dimension of social capital is more relevant in 
affecting the economic outcome (Franke, 2005). Single indicators, even though less 
complete, are less subjected to this kind of problem. Other works use inverse measures such 
as social dysfunctions, for instance crime. In the empirical work about the effect of social 
capital on income in Africa Lutz et al (2004) use the level of corruption as the inverse 
measure of social capital. The main problem of this approach is that social capital is likely to 
be only one potential contributor of the lack of crime rather than the only one.  
Overall we conclude that all these limitations should not discourage any new initiative and 
further projects on social capital and economic outcomes, rather they should have the reverse 
effect. From the economic perspective we believe we are just at the beginning and probably 
inside a dark room where theoretical and empirical frameworks are not clearly set yet. 
Therefore, caution in presenting empirical findings is advisable. Moreover, more prudence in 
deciding which variable should be considered a reasonable social capital proxy might 
represent a crucial starting point of any empirical work. 
 
 
 
9. Conclusions  
 
In this work we try to provide a road map of some of the theories and applications that the 
literature has proposed so far on the concept of social capital. This concept has attracted the 
attention of several scholars of different social science disciplines. On the one hand, this has 
created opportunities for some to attempt the development of a theoretical framework. On the 
other hand, this has induced some others to face empirical limitations in testing this 
theoretical framework. We mention some of these limitations and we suggest simple ways to 
mitigate their magnitude. We believe that these constraints should not discourage any further 
study on social capital. Instead, they should stimulate and enrich the debate under a 
theoretical and applied perspective. In the last decade, alternative techniques have been 
employed in this sense including, but not only, structural equation model (Sabatini 2009), 
network analysis (Garcia-Amado 2012; Siegel 2009), game theory (Antoci et al 2011; 
Poulsen and Svendsen 2005) and behavioural economic analysis (Bowles and Gintis 2002).        
From the socio-economic perspective there is a widespread perception that we are just at the 
beginning and probably inside a dark room where theoretical and empirical frameworks are 
not clearly developed yet. Therefore, caution in presenting empirical findings is advisable. In 
addition, more prudence in deciding which variable should be considered a reasonable social 
capital proxy might represent a crucial starting point of any work empirical and not. 
           
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
References  
 
Alesina, A Di Tella, R MacCulloch, R 2001 “Inequality and Happiness: Are European and 
Americans Different?” NBER Working Paper Series 8198 April 2001 
Antoci, A Sabatini, F Sodini, M (2011) “Bowling alone but tweeting together: the evolution 
of human interaction in the social networking era” Mimeo  
Arrow, K 1999 “Observations on Social Capital, in Dasgupta, P and Serageldin, I. (eds). 
Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective. The World Bank, Washington D.C. 
Banfield, E 1958 The Moral Basis of a Backward Society, New York, Free Press 
Bank of Italy (1999) “Sintesi delle note sull’andamento dell’economia nelle regioni italiane 
nel 1998 www.bancaditalia.it 
Bank of Italy (2003) “Sintesi delle note sull’andamento dell’economia nelle regioni italiane 
nel 2002 www.bancaditalia.it 
Bank of Italy (2004) “Sintesi delle note sull’andamento dell’economia nelle regioni italiane 
nel 2003 www.bancaditalia.it 
Baron, S Field, J Schuller, T 2000, Social Capital Critical Perspective, Oxford Oxford 
University Press 
Becker, G S 1974 “A Theory of Social Interactions” Journal of Political Economy Vol 82 
N. 6 p. 1063-1093 
Beugelsdijk, S Schaik, van Ton 2005 “Social Capital and Growth in European regions: an 
empirical test European Journal of Political Economy Vol. 21 pp. 301- 324 
Bourdieu, P 1983/1986 “The Forms of Capital” pp. 241-258 in Handbook of Theory and 
Research for the Sociology of Education, edited by J.G. Richardson. Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press    
Bowles, S Gintis, H (2002) “Social Capital and Community Governance” The Economic 
Journal Vol. 112 No. 483 pp. 419-436 
Brock, W Durlauf , S (2001) “Growth Empirics and Reality” World bank Economic Review 
Vol.15 (3) pp.229-72 
Bruni, L Sugden R (2000) “Moral canals: Trust and Social Capital in the Work of Hume, 
Smith and Genovesi” Economic and Philosophy 16:1 2000 21-45 
Carroll, T F 2001 “Social Capital, Local Capacity Building, and Poverty Reduction” Social 
Development Paper No. 3 Asian Development Bank 2001 
Casey, T (2004) “Social Capital and Regional Economies in Britain” Political Studies 52 (1) 
96-117 
Casey, T Christ, K (2005) “Social Capital and Economic Performance in American States” 
Social Science Quarterly 86, 4 , 826-845 
Coleman, S J 1988 “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital” American Journal of 
Sociology Vol. 94 pp. S95-S120 
Coleman, S J 1990 Foundations of social theory, Cambridge: Harward University Press 
Contini, B (2010) “Youth employment in Europe: institutions and social capital explain 
better than mainstream economics” IZA Discussion Paper No. 4718 
De Blasio, G Nuzzo, G (2010a) “Individual determinants of social behaviour” Journal of 
Socio-Economics Vol 39 (2010) p.466 – 473 
De Blasio, G Nuzzo, G (2010b) Historical traditions of civicness and local economic 
development Paper presented at “Capital sociale, istituzioni e comportamenti” Banca 
d’Italia, Roma 24 September 2010    
De Tocqueville, A (1832) (1994) Democracy in America Everyman’s Library, London  
Durkheim, E (1933) The Division of Labour in Society trans. George Simpson, The Free 
Press, New York 
24 
 
Durlauf, S N Fafchamps, M (2004) “Social Capital” The Centre for the Study of African 
Economies Working Paper Series Paper 214 
Easterly, W Levine, R (1997) “Africa’s growth tragedy: policies and ethnic divisions” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol.16 (5) pp.563-76 
Farr, J (2004) “Social Capital: A Conceptual History” Political Theory Vol. 32 N.1 
(Feb.2004) pp.6-33 
Ferray, M (2002) “Trust and Social Capital in the regulation of lending activities Journal of 
Socio-Economics Vol. 31 pp. 673-699 
Field, J 2008 Social Capital New York Routledge 
Fine, B (2001) Social capital versus Social Theory. Political economy and social science at 
the turn of the millennium Routledge London  
Fine, B (2002a) It Ain’t Social, It Ain’t Capital and It Ain’t Africa Studia Africana No 13, 
2002, pp. 18-33 
Fine, B (2002b) “They F**K You Up Those Social Capitalists” Antipode 2002, Oxford, UK   
Fukuyama, F 2001 “Social Capital, Civil Society and Development” Third World Quarterly, 
22, 1, 7-20 
Gambetta, D (2000) “Mafia: The Price of Distrust” in Gambetta, D Making and Breaking 
Cooperative Relations Electronic edition Chapter 10 pp. 158-175 
Garcia-Amado, L R Ruiz Perez, M Iniesta-Arandia, I Dahringer, G Reyes, F and Barrasa, S 
(2012) “Building Ties: Social capital network analysis in a forest community in a biosphere 
reserve in Chiapas, Mexico” Ecology and Society, Vol 17(3) No 3, pp. 1-12   
Genovesi, A (1820) Lezionidi commercio o sia di economia civile dell’abate Antonio 
Genovesi napoletano, a cui vanno uniti opuscoli interessantissimi riguardanti l’economia 
politica e l’agricoltura Vol.2 Milan Silvestri 
Glaeser, E L Laibson, D Sacerdote, B (2001) “The Economic Approach to Social Capital” 
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper N. 1916  
Granovetter, M (1973) “The Strength of Weak Ties” American Journal of Sociology    N. 78 
p. 1369-80 
Granovetter, M 1985 “Economic Action and Social Structure: the Problem of 
Embeddedness” American Journal of Sociology    N. 91 p. 481-510 
Grootaert, C (2001) “Does Social Capital Help the Poor? A Synthesis of Findings from the 
Local Level Institutions Studies in Bolivia, Burkina Faso, and Indonesia” World Bank 
Working Paper N.10 June 2001 
Grootaert, C (2002) “Social Capital, Household Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia” World 
Bank 2002  
Guiso, L Sapienza, P Zingales, L (2004) “The Role of Social Capital in Financial 
Development” American Economic Review Vol. 94, No. 3: 526-556 
Guiso, L Sapienza, P Zingales, L (2006) “Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?” The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 20 No. 2 pp. 23-48 (August 2006) 
Helliwell, J F Putnam, R D (1996) “Economic Growth and Social Capital in Italy” Eastern 
Economic Journal Vol.21 No. 3, Summer 1995 
Hineline, D R (2008) “Parameter heterogeneity in growth regressions” Economics Letters 
Vol.101 pp.126-129 
ISTAT (1998) “Parentela e reti di solidarieta’” Freguja, C Romano, M C  data available by 
consulting www.istat.it 
ISTAT (2003) “Parentela e reti di solidarieta’” Fraboni, R  data available by consulting 
www.istat.it 
ISTAT (2005) “Le organizzazioni di volontariato in Italia anno 2003”  ata available by 
consulting www.istat.it 
25 
 
Istituto Nazionale di Statistica “La poverta’ e l’esclusione sociale nelle regioni italiane. 
Anno 2002” ISTAT 17 dicembre 2003 www.istat.it 
Jamal, A A (2009) Barriers to democracy. The other side of social capital in Palestine and 
the Arab world Princeton University Press, Oxford and Princeton 
Knack, F (1999) “Social Capital, Growth and Poverty: A Survey of Cross-Country 
Evidence” Social Capital Initiative, Working paper No. 7  
Knack, F (2002) “Social capital and the Quality of Government: Evidence from the States 
American Journal of Political Science Vol. 46 No. 4 pp. 772-785 
Knack, F Keefer, P (1997) “Does Socialc Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-
Country Investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economisc112/4, 1251-1288 
Knack, Z (2001) “Trust and Growth” The Economic Journal Vol.111 (April) pp.295-321 
Lin, N 2001 Social Capital a theory of Social structure and Action Cambridge, CaMbridge 
University Press 
Lutz, M B Lutz, S H 2004 “The Contribution of Income, Social Capital, and Institutions to 
Human Well Being in Africa” ZEI Working Paper B 07 2004 
Lyon, T P (2005) Making Capitalism Work: Social Capital and Economic Growth in Italy 
1970-1995. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Nota di lavoro 70.2005  
Mauss, M (1969) The gift: forms and functions of exchanges in archaic societies trans. Ian 
Cunnison Cohen and West London  
Narayan, D 1999 “Bonds and Bridges: Social Capital and Poverty” World Bank 1999 
Narayan, D Cassidy, M F 2001 “A Dimensional Approach to Measuring Social Capital: 
Development and Validation of Social Capital Inventory” Current Sociology 49 (2), 59-102 
Narayan, D Woolcock, M 2000 “Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, 
research and Policy” The World Bank Research Observer Vol. 15 No. 2 August 2000, 225-
249 
Noteeboom, B (2006) “Social capital, Institutions and Trust” Tilburg university Discussion 
Paper N. 0924-7815 
Nuzzo, G (2006) “Un seconolo di statistiche sociali: persistenza o convergenza tra le regioni 
italiane?” Quaderni dell’Ufficio Ricerche Storiche Banca d’Italia N.11 December 2006 
OECD (2001) “The Well-being of Nations. The Role of Human and Social Capital” Centre 
for Educational Research and Innovation 
Olson, M (1982) The Rise and Decline of Nations New Haven CT: Yale University Press  
Paldam, M 2000 “Social Capital: One or Many? Definition and Measurement” Journal of 
Economic Surveys Vol. 14, N. 5 
Portes, A (1998) Social capital: its origins and applications in modern sociology” Annual 
review of Sociology pp.1-14 
Poulsen, A U Svendsen, G T (2005) Social Capital and Endogenous Preferences Public 
Choice 123: 171-196 
Putnam, R D 2000 Bowling Alone: the collapse and revival of American community, Simon 
& Schuster, New York 
Putnam, R D Leonardi, R Nanetti, R Y 1993 Making Democracy Work, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 
Routledge, B R, Von Amsberg, J 2003 “Social Capital and Growth” Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 50: 167-193 
Sabatini, F (2006) “The Empiric Social Capital and Economic Development: A Critical 
Perspective” Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei Nota di Lavoro 15.2006 
Sabatini, F (2009) “Social capital as social networks: a new framework for measurement 
and an empirical analysis of its determinants and consequences” The Journal of Socio-
Economics Vol.38 pp.429-442 
26 
 
Sabatini, F 2005a “Social Capital and Social Network. A new Framework for Measurement” 
Working Paper N.83 University of Rome “La Sapienza” Department of Public Economics 
Sabatini, F 2005b “The Role of Social Capital in Economic Development. Investigating the 
Causal Nexus through Structural Equations Models” University of Rome “La Sapienza” 
SalaiMartin, X (1997) “I just run 2 million regressions” American Economic Review 87, 
178-183 
Saxenian, A 1996 Regional Advantage Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 
128 Harvard, Harvard University Press 
Sciarrone, R (2002) “The Dark Side of Social Capital: The case of Mafia” Workshop on 
Social Capital and Civic Involvement Cornell University, September 13-14, 2002 
Siegel, D A (2009) Social networks and collective actions American Journal of Political 
Science Vol. 53, pp. 122-138  
Sonderskov, K M (2008) Making Cooperation Work: Generalized Social Trust and Large 
N-Collective Action Politicas Ph.d-serie Institute for Statskundskab, Aarhus Universitet 
2008 Aarhus 
Uphoff, N (1999) “Understanding social capital: learning from the analysis and experience 
of participation in Dasgupta and Seregeldin Social capital: A Multifaceted Perspective 
World Bank Washington DC, USA 
Uzzi, B 1997 “Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: The paradox of 
Embeddedness” Administrative Science Quarterly Vol 42, N. 1 p. 35-67 
Woolcock, M (1998) “Social Capital and Economic Development: toward a theoretical 
synthesis and policy framework” Theory and Society, 27, 2, 151-208 
Woolcock, M 2001 “The Place of Social Capital in Understanding Social and Economic 
Outcomes”, Isuma: Canadian Journal of Policy Research, 2, 1, 11-17 
Wooldridge, J M (2006) “Introductory Econometrics. A Modern Approach” Thomson 
 
